Measuring the Success of Acquisition Reform by Major DoD Components by Hunter, Andrew et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2015-08-01
Measuring the Success of Acquisition Reform
by Major DoD Components
Hunter, Andrew; Sanders, Greg; McCormick, Rhys; Cohen,
Samantha; McQuade, Maura Rose
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/53609
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Measuring the Outcomes  
of Acquisition Reform  












Measuring the Outcomes of Acquisition 




Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, and Senior Fellow 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20036 




Fellow, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20036 





Research Assistant, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20036 





Research Intern, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 
Maura Rose McQuade 
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to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide 
strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decision-makers chart a course toward a better 
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Abstract 
This paper establishes measurements to evaluate the success of the Department of Defense components in 
implementing recent acquisition reform policies, most notably elements of the Weapon Systems Reform 
Act of 2009 and the differing iterations of Better Buying Power. Due to the dataset available, success in 
this case reflects whether or not the policies adopted led to the specific outcomes sought, e.g. an increase 
in competition or small business utilization, rather than measuring improvement in overall contract cost, 
schedule and performance. By using publicly available data from the Federal Procurement Data System, 
this paper addresses six major questions: Have the DoD components increased their rates of effective 
competition since the introduction of BBP in 2010? How successful have the components been at 
promoting contracting opportunities for small businesses? How has DoD shifted between fixed-price and 
cost-plus contracts as guidance evolved? Did the recent reforms and legislation shift components’ 
acquisition portfolios? Have the components shifted away from certain contract vehicles? Did the recent 
reforms and legislation efforts shift components’ acquisition portfolios? 
By analyzing contracting trends for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, Missile 
Defense Agency, and the “Military Health” programs, this report provides important insights into what 
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Since the 1950s, ongoing deliberations among the Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and 
supporting defense industrial base have focused on reforming DoD’s acquisition and procurement 
process. Whether it was the 1980s campaign for Congress to reduce “waste, fraud, and abuse,” which led 
to the acquisition reforms enumerated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and related legislation; the 1990s 
movement to make acquisition more “responsive, effective and efficient,” which led to the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act; or the 2000s push to gain control over cost growth, which led to the 
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act, acquisition reform has appeared in multiple incarnations during 
the last half-century.1 Despite many implemented reforms being apparent “successes,” the problems of 
cost and schedule growth have remained significant and persistent. While acquisition reform can tune the 
system to the needs of the time, certain characteristics and problems persist. Accordingly, “reflecting on 
the defense acquisition reform studies of the past [six] decades, it is clear that the acquisition system has 
been strongly resistant to change.”2 
The facet of growth of cost and schedule provides a microcosm of the debate on why different reforms 
enacted by the Congress and internal DoD changes do not always have their intended effect. Some 
literature suggests that many of the reforms have failed to address root causes, even when they are 
nominally addressed in the reform package. Speaking to the need to improve incentives for and the 
training of the acquisition workforce, Dr. Ronald Fox, former Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, argues this line of thinking: “As long as defense acquisition is largely in the hands of 
managers for whom it is merely one step in a career path directed elsewhere, we will continue to see the 
same quality, cost, and scheduling problems.”3 Meanwhile, others argue that the failure is due to 
insufficient top-down direction to and within the DoD components. This paper does not provide a clear 
endorsement of either of these positions, but based upon the initial results presented below and past work 
on the topic, the study team argues that the implementation and institutionalization of reforms 
significantly varies between DoD components.4 When the reforms studied in this paper achieved their 
intended results, typically two or more components led the way while others lagged notably behind. This 
variation provides an opportunity to study institutionalization by digging deeper into the differences 
demonstrated in the contracting data record. One notable factor apparent from this work is that defense 
agencies, perhaps due to their narrower scope of acquisition activity, necessarily closer relationship 
between agency leadership and the acquisition workforce, and direct relationship to the Defense 
Acquisition Executive, exhibited the greatest responsiveness to policy guidance.  
Using publicly available data, CSIS first sought to establish measurements for recent reforms to assess the 
success of reform implementation at achieving stated outcome objectives and examine differences in 
performance among the DoD components, before ultimately looking at how DoD components may have 
institutionalized acquisition reforms differently. Leveraging nearly a decade’s worth of experience 
utilizing the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the study team analyzed contracting trends for the 
major DoD contracting components to measure how well they met the stated objectives of the recent 
reform efforts. The report first provides a history of acquisition reform and a methodology for leveraging 
                                                     
1 Christopher H. Hanks et al., Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet? (Washington, DC: 
RAND, 2005), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG291.pdf. 
2 J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform,1960–2009 An Elusive Goal (Washington, DC: Center of Military 
History, 2011), http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/acquisition_pub/CMH_Pub_51-3-1.pdf. 
3 Senate Permament Subcomitte on Investigations, “Defense Acquistion Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A 
Compendium of Views by Leading Experts,” 2014. 
4 Jesse Ellman, “Quality of Competition for Defense Contracts under ‘Better Buying Power’” (Center for Strategic 




the wealth of data in FPDS, before applying that methodology to DoD components to measure 
implementation of the reforms. The report then provides a background on the recent major reforms and 
how they sought to change the acquisition system. 
This report breaks out contracts by the policy regime on the date the contract was signed to provide a look 
at the successes and failures of each component’s implementation of that policy under the various 
reforms. The results are summarized below. 
Competition: Have the DoD components increased their rate of effective competition since the 
introduction of Better Buying Power (BBP) in 2010? 
Across the board, the data show DoD components made little progress in making contracting more 
competitive during BBP 1.0, but there is a glimmer of progress for BBP 2.0. The Air Force and Navy 
both lost ground under BBP 1.0 but began to recover under the second round of reforms. The Missile 
Defense Agency achieved a notable increase in competition under BBP 1.0 despite having a long history 
of low competition rates, but reverted to lower competition under the BBP 2.0 regime. The Defense 
Logistics Agency increased competition under BBP 1.0 and 2.0 above even its already high historical 
rates of competition 
Vendor Size: How successful have the components been at promoting contracting opportunities for 
small businesses? 
While prior efforts had smaller effects, BBP 2.0 showed a notable move toward small business 
contracting. This trend is led by the Army and does not extend to the Air Force. 
Contract Type: How has DoD shifted between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts as guidance evolved?  
There was a broad-based move toward fixed-price contracts, both for those components like Army that 
make heavy use of them already, those like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that rarely use them, and 
those in the middle such as Navy and Air Force. This level of consistency was not found for other reform 
measures. 
Product or Service Area: Did the recent reforms and legislation efforts shift components’ acquisition 
portfolios? 
Trends across the Department suggest that external events such as the drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq 
overwhelm the influence of reform efforts. Under BBP 1.0, the shares of contract obligations for R&D 
fell across the department in spite of guidance to protect the technology base. Under the Sec. 808 
guidance limiting certain kinds of services contract spending, the share of contract obligations for all 
types of services contracts actually rose across the Department, going from 41 percent of contract 
obligations to 44 percent.  
Contract Vehicle: Have the components shifted away from certain contract vehicles? 
Reversing trends earlier this century, for overall DoD there was actually a decrease in the use of multiple-
award vehicles when compared to the study period before the implementation of the reforms. Those 
trends are reflected within each of the components with the exception of MDA.  
Top Vendors: As DoD seeks efficiencies and savings, have major vendors moved out of specific 
markets? 
Across the Department of Defense, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and 
Northrop Grumman all retained their spots in the top six defense vendors. The components saw varying 
degrees of changes to their top vendors as the United States withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and 
subsequently drew down Defense budgets. The Army had the largest shifts of the military departments 
and the three smaller DoD components, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), MDA, and Military Health, all 
saw shifts in their top ten vendors to an even greater degree than those seen in the Army.  
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2 History of Acquisition Reform: What Did We Seek to Accomplish? 
The debate over how to best reform defense acquisition has been ongoing as long as there have been U.S. 
military forces, and has been a particular concern in the post–World War II era, when the U.S. strategy 
depended on the technological advantage that the acquisition system was designed to provide. Discussion 
persists today, with no less intensity than in the past, testifying to the perception that long-lasting, 
successful reform of the DoD acquisition and procurement process has yet to be reached. From 1989–
2002 alone, the DoD implemented 63 different acquisition reform policies.5 Historical reforms have 
ranged from efforts targeting perceived waste, fraud, and abuse in the 1980s, to a focus on streamlining 
overly rigid military specifications and processes in the 1990s, to a focus on transformational 
technologies under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the 2000s. The current debate in Congress 
on the role of service chiefs in acquisition, technology, and logistics, and debate around the effective 
integration of reforms by DoD components have recently dominated talk of acquisition reform. The 
following literature review discusses the various major acquisition reforms, including their goals, 
successes, and consequences. 
2.1 Pre-1980s Reforms: DoD 5000 Series  
The DoD’s 5000 Series refers to the complete set of departmental instructions governing the policy and 
procedure of defense acquisition. The instructions reflect changes in the acquisition and implementation 
process, and are updated to reflect new directives, regulations, and policies. According to a 2005 RAND 
study, the 5000 Series “is the program manager’s ‘Bible’—i.e., the place where Program Managers are 
supposed to go for policy guidance.”6 The first iteration, DoD Directive (DODD) 5000.1, was released in 
1971 with the accompanying instructional document DODI 5000.2. The DoD has since updated the 
initiatives multiple times in response to fluctuating systems in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD).7 Due to the wide historical breadth of the series, a study of its history can be a reference in 
examining acquisition reform initiatives. For example, Joe Ferrara, in his analysis in Acquisition Review 
Quarterly, observes the following trend: “The founding 5000.1 set the tone and all subsequent documents 
have been remarkably consistent in continuing to articulate a few key themes.”8 To Ferrara, this 
demonstrates a consistency in policy, yet also an inability to make significant progress addressing the 
underlying problem. Subsequent revisions over the next decades continue to add more detail and policy to 
align with changing OSD goals.  
2.2 1980s Acquisition Reform Efforts-Defense Reorganization 
The acquisition reform efforts of the 1980s occurred at the same time as a significant reorganization of 
the Department of Defense focused on better integrating the military departments and the military 
services as part of the reforms enacted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The acquisition reforms 
adopted at this time were fueled by high profile accusations of fraud, waste, and abuse in the acquisition 
system regarding seemingly simple items such as hammers and toilet seats.9  
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management: The Packard Commission  
In response to criticism of DoD for cost increases and mischarges, President Ronald Reagan established a 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known as the Packard Commission, “as a preemptive 
measure to deflect the litany of growing criticism leveled against his administration and the Pentagon by 
                                                     
5 Hanks et al., Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet? 
6 Ibid. 
7 Joe Ferrara, “DOD’s 5000 Documents: Evolution and Change in Defense Acquisition Policy,” Acquisition Review 
Quarterly, Fall (1996), http://www.dau.mil/AckerLibrary/AckerLibraryDocs/ferrar.pdf. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009 An Elusive Goal, 14. 
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external pressure groups, Congress, and the media.”10 The 1986 Packard Commission, chaired by former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Hewlett Packard co-founder David Packer, reviewed defense 
acquisition and related processes including the budget process, procurement system, and legislative 
oversight of all aspects of the defense industry.11 Ultimately, the Commission issued the following 
recommendations to improve the defense acquisition system:12  
1. The creation of a new position, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, USD(A), 
responsible for overseeing and setting policy for the entirety of the DoD acquisition system.  
2. The creation of new positions, Senior Acquisition Executives, within each of the services to be 
responsible for the management of acquisition within each service.  
3. The creation of the Program Executive Officer (PEO) positions within the services to be 
responsible for the oversight of program managers in charge of major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs).  
4. The creation of a vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would co-chair a Joint 
Requirement Management Board with the USD(A) that would be responsible for approval and 
oversight of requirements for new MDAPs. 
The Packard Commission also aimed to increase the use of commercial products by emphasizing front-
end planning. This meant the utilization of standard commercial components instead of over-specialized 
parts, reducing high costs of procurement in small quantities. It also recommended increased procurement 
of off-the-shelf commercial products over those that were only designed for the military. In addition, the 
Commission recommended increasing the role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) in prototyping and pursuing joint programs.13 
In theory, the recommended reforms would create a more efficient acquisition process. However, Ronald 
Fox concluded in Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal that “Even though many of 
the Packard Commission recommendations became law, they did not all bring about significant 
procedural changes in the weapons acquisition process or in the training, assignments, or tenure of 
program managers.”14 Waivers to this process were frequently granted and the reforms lacked clarity and 
furthered conflicting priorities. As a result, Fox said, the “organizational ambiguity enabled the Army, the 
Navy, and the Air Force to maintain considerable control over weapons acquisition.”15 These failures in 
the management issues resulted from conflicting expectations for the USD(A) from Congress, the military 
services, industry, and OSD.  
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GWN) 
incorporating many of the Packard Commission reforms.16 Several bills were passed in close proximity to 
GWN in 1986 and early 1987 that contained related changes to the acquisition system originating in the 
Packard Commission recommendations; however, for simplicity's sake, this paper will discuss these 
acquisition reforms generally as part of GWN. Part of an unprecedented restructuring of DoD, the 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 127.  
11 “Executive Order 12526—President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,” Federal Register, 
July 18, 1985, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1985.html. 
12 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, An Interim Report to the President (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 16. 
13 Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009 An Elusive Goal, 131. 
14 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, An Interim Report to the President, 132. 
15 Ibid. 
16 The creation of the USD(A) occurred prior to GWN with the passage of the Military Retirement Reform Act of 




Goldwater-Nichols reforms established the command structure that exists to this day. GWN’s primary 
goal was the centralization of civilian authority, and it worked toward nine objectives, including the 
strengthening of civilian authority, an increase in efficiency for the utilization of resources, an increase in 
success of joint officer management, and improvement of the management and administration of DoD.17 
To meet these objectives, GWN reformed the structure of DoD to increase coherence and enhance the 
roles of the Joint Staff and OSD. Soon after, these initiatives were incorporated into a new issuance of the 
5000.1 directive. This revised version established a new acquisition chain of command and adjusted 
Department structure to assist in management of new bodies. It additionally established new acquisition 
milestones for review.18 
GWN established the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), chaired by the USD(A) and vice-chaired by the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which was to act as a forum to advise the USD(A) on 
decisions regarding major acquisition category (ACAT)1D programs.19 GWN also established the “three-
tiered acquisition management chain of command within each service consisting of a service acquisition 
executive, program executive officer, and program manager.”20  
In a paper analyzing GWN and its results throughout the first four years after its passage, Vincent Davis 
in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science applauded the increased 
centralization in DoD as a result of GWN appointing the JCS as “the big boss of the entire overall joint 
system on the uniformed side of the defense establishment, a side that was previously weak and without 
an effective boss or patron or constituency.”21 Davis also mentioned how this met the specific goal of 
“sharply reducing layers in the chain of command between the White House and deployed forces.”22 In 
contrast to this analysis, a paper written in 2001 by James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, focuses on the incompleteness of these 
reforms and unresolved disputes between civilian and military officials. Locher found that “The 
department itself, however, still has no concept of its needs for joint officers or of how to prepare and 
reward them. The officer corps is much smaller now than it was when Goldwater-Nichols was passed; 
this is no area in which to be adrift. It requires, again, a balance between joint and service emphasis.” 23 
The paper also criticized GWN on its efforts to increase efficiency in the use of resources. Locher argued 
that services have yet to dismantle the funding of Cold War systems at the same time that the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council has been “rubber-stamping” the decisions of the services without taking 
joint concerns into consideration.24 
These critiques suggest that while Goldwater-Nichols was a positive step in reorganizing DoD, the 
acquisition changes in the 1980s failed to make some of the necessary changes in culture and that the 
acquisition management chain-of-command guidelines recommended by the Packard Commission that 
were put into law by Congress did not immediately lead to improved coordination between OSD and the 
military services. The purpose of increasing the capabilities of the Joint Staff was so they would be 
functioning at the same level as OSD and so cooperation would be more fluid. Lochler argued that OSD 
                                                     
17 James R. Locher, “Has It Worked?,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 4 (2001): 106, 
http://www.ngade.com/uploads/GoldwaterNichols.pdf. 
18 Ferrara, “DOD’s 5000 Documents: Evolution and Change in Defense Acquisition Policy.” 
19 Ibid., 134. 
20 Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009 An Elusive Goal, 135. 
21 Vincent Davis, “Defense Reorganization and National Security,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 517, no. 1 (1991): 159, doi:10.1177/0002716291517001012. 
22 Ibid., 170. 




was weakened during this time period, preventing improved coordination from happening.25 Additionally, 
Fox concluded that there were “conflicting motivations, mismatched priorities and institutional rivalries” 
between the Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon.26 In response to the Packard Commission and 
GWN, Fox argued that the dichotomy between management of profit-maximizing businesses and that of 
governmental institutions such as DoD prohibited success in this business approach to defense 
acquisition. Although not all aspects of GWN have been well received, the implementation of GWN 
established the basic acquisition structure that persists to this day.  
2.3 1990s Reform Efforts—Streamlining and Move to Commercial Contracts 
Acquisition reforms in the 1990s focused more directly toward streamlining the acquisition process and 
acquiring commercial products, as well as improving the education and effectiveness of the acquisition 
workforce.  
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act  
One of the key findings of the Packard commission and other reform efforts was that the acquisition 
workforce (AW) was both too large and underperforming as a result of being “undertrained, underpaid, 
and inexperienced.”27 These reports concluded that it was vitally important to make improvements to the 
training and motivation of the current personnel to improve the quality of the AW. The first reform effort 
of the 1990s, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), aimed to improve the 
education and effectiveness of the AW. Key objectives of DAWIA were to “provide a clear track for the 
acquisition workforce, educate the workforce, increase the number of senior-level acquisition positions 
that civilians were qualified to fill, provide career growth, and increase acquisition expertise and 
experience.”28 Furthermore, DAWIA aimed to reduce the size of the AW in order to increase efficiency. 
Evaluations on both the success of implementation and long-term outcomes of DAWIA remain mixed. A 
1997 analysis of DAWIA by Andrew Garcia et al. in Acquisition Review Quarterly, however, argued, 
“[DAWIA] has succeeded in prompting the DoD components to take the steps necessary to 
professionalize the defense acquisition workforce.”29 It observed that, as a direct result of DAWIA, 
“Military departments have raised standards, increased training, and enhanced development of their 
acquisition personnel.”30  
According to a 1992 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the implementation of DAWIA, 
DoD faced a variety of setbacks during the implementation of its provisions.31 The report observed that 
“The process of identifying acquisition positions and evaluating the individual qualifications of each 
member of the work force is time-consuming and may delay implementation of key act provisions.”32 The 
                                                     
25 Ibid 
26 Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009 An Elusive Goal. 
27 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, An Interim Report to the President, 66. 
28 Joseph Kevin Pope, “Measuring the Effect of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act” (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1997), 75, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA331749.  
29 Andrea Garcia et al., “The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act: Five Years Later,” Acquisition 
Review Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1997): 305. 
30 Pope, “Measuring the Effect of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act,” 75. 
31 In 2004, the Government Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office. For the 
purposes of this paper the acronym GAO refers to both iterations of the name.  
32 Government Accounting Office, “Implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act” 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/215582.pdf. 
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GAO also reported that financial obstacles and controversy over appointing civilians to certain critical 
positions within the services would likely delay implementation.33  
Garcia, et al. further noted that DAWIA implementation still showed areas for improvement. They stated 
that the lack of uniformity across DoD components provided a barrier to the reform’s implementation, 
and prevented complete Department success. The opportunities for professional development and 
education for civilian and military personnel also remained too low to adequately respond to industry 
demands.34 
Long-Term DAWIA Consequences: Too Small of an Acquisition Workforce? 
The implementation of DAWIA led to severe reductions in the size of the acquisition workforce, both as a 
result of increased training requirements and mandated cuts stemming from provisions in the legislation. 
For example, DAWIA “required [the] Secretary of Defense to reduce the number of employees in [the] 
Department of Defense acquisition force on [the] last day of each fiscal year . . . by not less than [a] 
number equal to 4 percent of [the] number of employees,” resulting in a 20 percent reduction of the 
workforce.35 Additionally, increased training and position requirements limited the amount of available, 
competitive employees with adequate credentials.36 A 2013 RAND report stated that the “civilian AW, as 
measured by the DAWIA count, hit a low of 77,504” in 1999.37 The issue persisted into the 21st century, 
as the Army-established Gansler Commission reported in 2007 that increased workload and workforce 
demands had stalled after encountering insufficient AW.38 A further analysis completed by the GAO in 
2012 observed that, as a result of DAWIA, the “lack of an adequate number of trained acquisition and 
contract oversight personnel contributed to unmet expectations and at times has placed DoD, at risk of 
potentially paying more than necessary.”39 
Attempting to reverse the consequences of workforce reductions implemented by DAWIA and continued 
by Congress for several additional years after the initial reductions, the 2008 Congress created the 
Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF), which, while following 
many of the same goals as DAWIA, called for an increase in the size of the AW.40 In its FY2012 Annual 
Report to Congress, the DAWDF stated that its primary purpose “had been to rebuild the capacity and 
size of the Defense Acquisition Workforce.”41 Through initiatives such as recruiting incentives and 
outreach programs, retention incentives, and training enhancement, a report published by RAND reported 
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that the civilian AW numbered over 136,000 by the end of FY2011.42 A 2012 GAO report concluded that, 
despite issues with fund distribution, DAWDF was responsible for strong success in increasing the 
capacity of the acquisition workforce.43  
Secretary of Defense Perry White Paper—Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change  
In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry published a white paper titled Acquisition Reform: A 
Mandate for Change, which argued that the cost of doing business remained too high and fundamental 
system change was necessary.44 According to a report published in the Defense Acquisition Review 
journal, Perry’s mandate directed the DoD toward reform based upon products and outcomes, and away 
from a process-focused strategy.45 As a result, he pushed industry to maintain a technological edge over 
its adversaries while reducing costs.46 Perry authorized the appointment of House Armed Services 
Committee veteran Colleen A. Preston as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, 
where most literature credits her with an attempt to reform the acquisition process to make it focus more 
directly on products rather than the process. Defense Acquisition Review journal author Edward Rogers 
notes, “It thus was a mandate for both increased efficiency and effectiveness while restructuring the 
industry-government relationship base.”47 The administration’s resulting emphasis on commercial 
products, simplification and streamlining of processes, and reduction of extraneous oversight led to the 
motto “faster, better and cheaper” to describe the reform goals. In order to better integrate civilian and 
military sectors, eliminate unnecessary costs, and reduce oversight, Preston formed ad hoc Project Action 
Teams (PATs) with the goal of discovering how to best implement industry streamlining and 
commercially available products into the defense industry.48 Ronald Fox notes that these efforts 
significantly impacted the defense community by demonstrating that the DoD leadership was committed 
to reform; this effort was furthered by a congressionally approved mandate to reduce acquisition systems 
management and acquisition costs by 25 percent by October 1998.49 
Federal Streamlining Act of 1994 
In 1994, Senate staff produced an influential procurement reform bill, entitled S.1597, the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). According to a 1998 GAO report, FASA was intended to 
streamline the acquisition process and promote the use of commercial products and acquisition 
approaches.50 It streamlined the process further by simplifying procedures for contracts under $100,000.51 
According to a 2002 RAND report, FASA eased access to commercial products by requiring “contracting 
officers to take advantage of commercial warranties, and requires them to ensure that, as far as possible, 
the government benefits from at least the same warranty terms as those customarily available to the 
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general public.”52 The Small Business Committee also highly favored FASA because of its “particular 
sensitivity to the interests of small businesses.”53  
These initiatives represent important successes in the acquisition reform progression. Available literature 
notes that the defense community recognized the efforts of Preston and the PATs as positive steps. 
According to a 2001 GAO report, FASA implemented reforms that would aid small businesses in the 
defense industry. The report stated, “For example, FASA increased the threshold of federal contracts 
exclusively reserved for small businesses.”54 FASA also increased market opportunity for commercial 
products. A 2011 report by Aerospace Industries Association stated that, as a result of FASA, 
“Commercial companies were able to begin participating in government programs as prime contractors or 
subcontractors, using common product lines and work forces to provide products and services for both 
commercial and military customers.”55 A further success was FASA’s bipartisan support, which, 
according to Fox, “helped fuel a spirit of reform.”56  
However, despite these reforms, there remained little streamlining effort for projects over $100,000, 
which often involved the most bureaucracy. According to the 2001 GAO report, small businesses were 
also concerned that “FASA exempted purchases of $2,500 or less from the range of contracts previously 
reserved.”57 Most importantly, FASA did not significantly impact DoD and contractor activities. Fox 
concludes that “FASA ultimately moved the defense acquisition behemoth in the right direction but left 
most DoD and contractor activities largely unchanged.”58 Part of this may stem from alterations in the 
legislation after its passing. One report notes that FASA “has been sub-optimized by many legislative and 
regulatory changes in recent years,” gravitating back to policies prior to its enactment.59 The 2002 RAND 
study reported that “it has become apparent that many of the hoped-for benefits of [acquisition reform] 
have not been fully realized.”60 RAND specifically identified targeted training, integration, and industry 
partnership as remaining barriers to success in the acquisition reform efforts of the 1990s.61 
2.4 The Rumsfeld Doctrine: Revolutions in Military Affairs and DoD Transformation 
When Donald Rumsfeld was confirmed as Secretary of Defense in 2001, he entered the position with 
ambitious plans to reform the operations of the defense community to better align with a post–Cold War 
agenda. These plans were put into action via Rumsfeld’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which, as 
the Brookings Institution reported, placed increased significance on information technology and 
attempted to create a more flexible and agile military, able to adapt to emerging threats and maintain 
global superiority in defense technology.62 In his confirmation hearing, Rumsfeld laid out his intention for 
total department transformation, stating that it “may require a near-term investment to acquire modern 
capabilities derived from U.S. scientific and industrial pre-eminence, rather than simply upgrading 
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existing systems.”63 He emphasized the importance of acquiring key technology and proper warfighting 
products over the process of their production.64 According to Rumsfeld, this was a necessary reform in an 
era of rapid technological advances.  
Additionally, Secretary Rumsfeld looked to address the bureaucracy and sluggishness ingrained in the 
Pentagon’s acquisition process by emphasizing the need for rapid technological development and 
adaptability. By 2002, he was encouraging industry investments in critical technological advances, such 
as information warfare and precision weaponry.65 In doing so, the Secretary of Defense aimed to 
transform DoD into a more business-like structure, rather than placing importance on money-saving 
strategies.66 Simultaneously, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz canceled the active 5000 
Series documents and worked to revise the policy. Modified versions, issued in 2003, were both 
shortened and adjusted to provide more flexibility in program execution, in addition to promoting 
knowledge and planning before a product’s developmental stage.67 A GAO review of the policy stated 
that they could “put DoD’s decision makers in a better position to deliver high-quality products on time 
and within budget.”68 
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was created to address DoD 
requirements and abilities, demonstrating a “shift away from threat-based assessments to capability-based 
assessments of warfighter needs.”69 The JCIDS addressed a need for more integrated, concepts-oriented 
capabilities across all components. In 2004, DoD created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, aimed at 
continuing coordination efforts between the services, avoiding bureaucratic overhaul, and rapidly 
administering needed technology for urgent operational needs.70  
Rumsfeld’s initiatives ultimately brought limited success. He struggled to work collaboratively with 
congressional and Department officials, who cited his inability to negotiate as a barrier to progress, and he 
appointed like-minded individuals into positions of authority.71 Rumsfeld’s critiques of a bloated and 
bureaucratic Pentagon created a hostile environment between the Secretary and the services, who pushed 
back against the sudden shifts away from traditional capabilities and joined Congress in resenting 
Rumsfeld’s increased effort to assert control.72 During Rumsfeld’s tenure, Congress increased defense 
spending to record-highs, but the department nevertheless initially struggled to meet the needs of 
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warfighters deployed to Iraq, due to logistical failure and adaptability.73 A report by the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment remarked on Rumsfeld’s defense budget, saying that “Despite its 
high costs, this plan may also fall short of meeting U.S. security requirements if the kinds of challenges 
faced by the U.S. military change significantly over the coming years.”74 His desire to transform the U.S. 
Armed Forces into an agile, lightly moving body with high-tech weaponry proved incompatible with 
evolving counterinsurgency operations.  
The proposed shift to transformational capabilities rarely materialized. Analysis by Timothy Came and 
Colin Campbell in 2005 noted that, despite a few major cuts such as the Comanche helicopter program, 
“The administration is continuing to move ahead with the vast majority of the major weapons platforms 
in the plans it inherited from the Clinton Administration.”75 Furthermore, despite reform attempts, the 
Hon. David Walker, former Comptroller General of the U.S. and head of the GAO, noted that “Many 
current major-weapons systems programs continue to suffer the same cost over-runs and schedule 
delays.”76 Part of this may stem from a lack of guidance regarding program implementation. In a review 
of Defense Acquisition Best Practices, the GAO found that many of the proposed acquisition reforms 
“had not been sufficiently incorporated into either policies or the guidance.”77 The report further stated 
that “effective controls for ensuring that best practices are appropriately followed are not adequately 
provided for in the policies.”78 
In 2008, another version of DoD 5000.02 instruction was released. In this new version, review processes 
were expanded and made mandatory, increasing the number and frequency of oversight policies. The 
reissuance emphasized competitive prototyping, independent assessments, and more effective testing and 
development phase division.79 A review of the new policies by the National Research Council stated that 
a revised 5000.02 “does not appreciably change the focus on milestones but it introduces more oversight 
reviews with the aim of achieving better acquisition results.”80 
2.5 Recent Acquisition Reforms  
The major reforms that the study team will be testing are the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
of 2009 (WSARA), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 Section 843, 
the 2009 NDAA Sections 863 and 864, Better Buying Power (BBP), and the 2012 NDAA Section 808. 
These reform efforts sought to bring efficiencies to the system, but through different means. WSARA 
focused more heavily on reducing the time and cost overruns of the Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) by achieving better knowledge and enhancing planning in the early stages of the acquisition 
process. The 2009 NDAA Section 864 focused on enhancing the effective use of cost-reimbursement 
contracts. The BBP series focused more on providing acquisition officials policy and program 
implementation guidance to find efficiencies across all levels of ACAT, to include MDAPs. Sec. 843 of 
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the 2008 NDAA and Sec. 863 sought to reform competition and usage of single-award and multi-award 
contracts. Finally, Sec. 808 of the 2012 NDAA placed limitations on DoD’s contract services.  
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) 
Passed unanimously in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was signed into law by President Obama on May 22, 2009. Designed to 
both reform and curtail time and cost overruns of the major weapon systems, WSARA created new 
positions designed to provide better knowledge of matters of cost, systems engineering, and technological 
maturity early in the acquisition process. In signing the bill, President Obama said, “the purpose of this 
law will be to limit cost overruns before they spiral out of control. It will strengthen oversight and 
accountability by appointing officials who will be charged with closely monitoring the weapons systems 
we're purchasing to ensure that costs are controlled.”81  
WSARA made a substantial number of changes designed to reduce time and cost overruns in acquiring 
the largest weapon systems. It created or modified a number of positions within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, including Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (D, CAPE), Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test & Evaluation (DTE), Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Systems Engineering, and Director of Performance and Root Cause Analysis.82   
Other notable acquisition process changes included: 
 Requirements for competitive acquisition strategies, at both the prime and subcontract levels 
 Modifying the requirements process to include: 
o Allowing Combatant Commanders the opportunity to provide inputs on joint 
requirements 
o Providing that USD AT&L, USD Comptroller, and D, CAPE serve as advisers to the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
o Considering cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs at the requirements-generation 
stage of acquisition  
 Improved cost estimation processes83 
 Tougher requirements for continuing programs experiencing critical cost breaches 
 A more stringent set of regulations on organizational conflicts of interest 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 Section 843: Enhanced Competition 
Requirements for Task and Delivery Order Contracts 
As part of the 2008 NDAA, Section 843 instituted changes to Title 10, United States Code, on the 
management and usage of single-award and multi-award task and delivery orders. These changes came in 
the form of three primary regulatory changes: limits on single-award task or delivery order contracts over 
$100 million, enhanced competition requirements for orders in excess of $5 million, and a general 
prohibition of protests on the issuance of task or delivery orders. Under the new regulations, single-award 
task or delivery contracts over $100 million could only be awarded with the explicit written permission of 
the head of the respective military component. Even then, the military head could only approve contracts 
if they were: (a) deemed to be so integral only a single source could reasonably perform the work; (b) 
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firm, fixed-price task or delivery; (c) “only one source is qualified and capable of performing the work at 
a reasonable price to the government”; and (d) “because of exceptional circumstances, it is necessary in 
the public interest to award the contract to a single source.” 84  
The second regulatory change required that for task or delivery orders over $5 million under a multiple-
award contract, all contractors on the contract be given a fair opportunity to compete.85 Finally, the 2008 
NDAA authorized bid protests related to the issuance task or delivery orders of over $10 million. 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009  
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, hereafter the 2009 NDAA, 
instructed two major revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). First, Section 863 extended 
some of the competition requirements for task and delivery order contracts made in the 2008 NDAA to all 
federal agencies. Second, Section 864 mandated revisions on the effective use and management of cost-
reimbursement contracts.  
Section 863: Requirements for Purchase of Property and Services Pursuant to Multiple-Award Contracts  
Section 863 contained guidance on the requirements for increased competition for multiple-award 
contracts and public notice of sole-source task or delivery orders made under multiple-award contracts. 
The law dictated that any task or delivery order under a multi-award contract over the simplified 
acquisition threshold must be made on a competitive basis unless a statutory exception applies or an 
agency is mandated by law to select from a specific source.86 The final FAR rule on implementing 
Section 863 this change and also required public notice before the award of all sole-source task and 
delivery order contracts over the simplified acquisition threshold.87  
Section 864: Regulations on the Use of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts  
Section 864’s regulatory changes to cost-reimbursement changes occurred in four areas: guidance on 
cost-reimbursement contracts, identification of acquisition plan findings, acquisition workforce resources, 
and contract administration functions. The guidance on cost-reimbursement contracts explained under 
what circumstances contracting officers should select a contract type other than firm-fixed-price, under 
what circumstances cost-reimbursement should be used, and how to combine contract types. The next 
changes, those surrounding the identification of acquisition plan findings, required greater levels of 
documentation from the acquisition professionals and managers in the process of selecting a contract 
type. The third category of changes, acquisition workforce resources, ensured that contracting officers 
have access to helpful resources, noting that cost-reimbursement contracts are more complicated than 
firm-fixed-price. It also required properly trained contracting officer’s representative (COR) or 
contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) to be used in managing the contracts.88 
                                                     
84 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. CONGRESS, 2007), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-110hrpt477/pdf/CRPT-110hrpt477.pdf. 
85 The 2008 NDAA defines fair opportunity as: (1) notice of the task or delivery order with requirements clearly 
stated; (2) reasonable period for responses; (3) “disclosure of the significant factor and sub factors”; (3) “written 
statements documenting the basis for the award and the relative importance of quality and price or cost factors” for 
contracts to be awarded on best value; and (4) post-award debriefing opportunity.  
86 Simplified Acquisition Threshold = Contracts less than $150,000 except for those supporting contingency or 
counter-weapons of mass destruction missions. For those missions, the SAT is $300,000 for contracts awarded and 
performed or purchase to be made within the United States and $1 million for those outside the United States.  
87 “Federal Acquisition Regulation: Requirements for Acquisitions Pursuant to Multiple-Award Contracts,” Federal 
Register, March 2, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-02/pdf/2012-4485.pdf. 
88 “Federal Acquisition Regulation: Proper Use and Management of Cost Reimbursement Contracts,” Federal 
Register, March 16, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-16/pdf/2011-5552.pdf. 
14 
 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 Section 808: Temporary Limitation on 
Aggregate Annual Amount for Contract Services89 
In the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, hereafter the 2012 NDAA, Congress 
temporarily restricted the amount DoD could annually spend on services contracts. Section 808, the 
contract services restriction provision, prohibited DoD from exceeding the FY2010 services contract 
obligation levels in FY2012 or FY2013 with the exception of: (1) military construction, (2) research and 
development, (3) services funded by Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and (4) services that 
moved from OCO to the base budget funding. In addition to restrictions on overall services spending, the 
provision dictated DoD to reduce spending on services for contractors performing functions closely 
associated with inherently governmental functions and staff augmentation services by 10 percent each. 
In June 2012, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued DoD guidance for compliance with 
Section 808’s provisions, which was followed by an implementation memo from then-Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Richard Ginman on July 31, 2012.90 To meet the guidance, 
DoD directed contracting offers not to exceed the contractor’s FY10 labor and overhead rates for any 
contracts over $10 million. The guidance further stated that total value of the contract services could not 
exceed the amount paid in FY2010 for similar services without the approval of the Service Secretary of 
component head.  
These restrictions on services contract spending were subsequently extended to include Fiscal Years 2014 
and 2015 with the inclusion of provisions to amend Section 808 of the 2012 NDAA in both the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 2015 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.91 
Better Buying Power  
Anticipating the imminent budget tightening that eventually led to the passage of the Budget Control Act, 
then-Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Ashton Carter introduced the first iteration of BBP on June 28, 
2010.92 This new initiative supported a Department-wide goal to find efficiencies and savings within the 
contracted portion of the DOD budget. Under the overarching goal to “do more without more,” the new 
initiative had seven main objectives: 93 
 Deliver the warfighting capability we need for the dollars we have 
 Get better buying power for the warfighter and taxpayer 
 Restore affordability to defense goods and services 
 Improve defense industry productivity 
 Remove government impediments to leanness 
 Avoid program turbulence 
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 Maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry 
Accompanying BBP were implementation guidelines containing general guidance and specific actions for 
the five major areas: target affordability and controlling cost growth, incentivize productivity and 
innovation in industry, promote real competition, improve tradecraft in services acquisition, and reduce 
non-productive processes and bureaucracy.94 To target affordability and control cost growth, Carter 
directed acquisition managers to mandate affordability as a requirement for potential acquisition 
programs, drive productivity growth through will-cost/should-cost management, eliminate redundancy 
within warfighter portfolios, make production rates economical and hold them stable, and set shorter 
program timelines and manage to them.  
To incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, the guidelines directed acquisition managers to 
reward contractors for successful supply chain and indirect expense management, increase the use of 
fixed-price incentive firm-target (FPIF) contract type, and reinvigorate the industry’s independent R&D 
and protect the defense technology base. To promote real competition, the guidelines recommended 
presenting a competitive acquisition strategy at each program milestone, removing obstacles to 
competition such as requiring open systems architectures, and increasing dynamic small business’ role in 
defense marketplace competition.  
In 2012, two years after the launch of Better Buying Power 1.0, DoD published a second iteration of the 
initiative. According to Under Secretary (AT&L) Frank Kendall, the progression from BBP 1.0 to 2.0 
“reflected a change in emphasis from specific ‘best practices’ to an increased emphasis on helping 
acquisition professionals think critically and make better decisions as they confront the myriad, complex 
situations we encounter in defense acquisition.”95 Continuing the efforts of BBP 1.0, BBP 2.0 represented 
not a major change in policy, but a shift in the cited emphasis while retaining the core initiatives.  
While retaining the core values of the first iteration, BBP 2.0 created 36 initiatives with seven focus areas. 
These initiatives maintain BBP 1.0’s core interest in achieving better buying power for the warfighter and 
the taxpayer while emphasizing a new focus on the importance of the acquisition workforce. The seven 
focus areas comprised:  
 Achieving affordable programs 
 Controlling costs throughout the product lifecycle 
 Incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry and government 
 Eliminating unproductive processes and bureaucracy 
 Promoting effective competition 
 Improving tradecraft in acquisition of services 
 Improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce96 
Furthermore, BBP 2.0 emphasized the enforcement of the implemented initiatives to create affordability 
constraints. The general guidance of BBP 2.0 explains how the affordability constraints will be 
formulated, met, and enforced. Specifically, a portfolio such as a tactical aircraft for the Air Force or a 
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ground combat vehicle for the Army should be analyzed by a predetermined and systematic process that 
will decide whether or not the program is affordable. If the analysis decides it is not affordable, it will be 
necessary to procure a lower-cost product or choose to lower the costs of a different program within 
another component’s portfolio.97 
Continuing the overarching theme to improve costs and efficiencies within the defense acquisition 
enterprise, the Under Secretary (AT&L) Frank Kendall published the third iteration of BBP: Better 
Buying Power 3.0 in April 2015. While BBP 3.0 maintains the themes from its predecessors to increase 
efficiency in DoD, it emphasizes the reduction of bureaucracy, the improvement of contracted services, 
and the shift toward innovation and technical excellence. The shift toward innovation and technical 
excellence focuses on the goal of maintaining U.S. technological superiority.98  
One long-term initiative of BBP 3.0 is increasing DoD support for science, technology, engineering, and 
math (STEM) education and careers. The general guidance for this initiative includes direct and indirect 
support from DoD to STEM education. It also dictates the strengthening of relationships between DoD 
and the civilian technical community. Under this initiative, DoD is instructed to become more desirable 
for professionals in STEM careers to improve RDT&E in DoD. 99 BBP 3.0 continues the goals of 
improving efficiency combined with an attempt to orient the system to the greatest perceived challenges 
of the time.  
3 Methodology 
For nearly a decade, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has issued a series of analytical 
reports on federal contract spending for national security across the government. This report builds and 
expands on this well-established methodology developed for previous reports in order to assess how the 
components have implemented the recent round of acquisition reforms.100  
3.1 Study Design 
The limitations of FPDS restrict the ability of the study team to assess certain elements of recent 
acquisition reforms. For example, the study team has no visibility into whether contracts are awarded 
under lowest-price technically acceptable (LPTA) source-selection criteria. The study team has attempted 
to study a variety of such questions through alternate avenues, such as searching for LPTA and variants in 
solicitations posted to the FedBizOps website, but while that term is commonly referenced by vendors it 
often does not appear in the full text description. The end result of these explorations was a determination 
that the study team’s efforts were best spent making more effective use of FPDS than trying to integrate 
new outside sources. For those reasons, the study team focused on six contract characteristics that are 
observable through FPDS data: 
 Competition: Have the DoD components increased their rate of effective competition since the 
introduction of BBP in 2010? 
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 Vendor Size: How successful have the components been at promoting contracting opportunities 
for small businesses? 
 Contract Type: How has DoD shifted between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts as guidance 
evolved?  
 Product or Service Area: Did the recent reforms and legislation efforts shift components’ 
acquisition portfolios? 
 Contract Vehicle: Have the components shifted away from certain contract vehicles? 
 Top Vendors: As DoD seeks efficiencies and savings, have major vendors moved out of specific 
markets? 
To assess how the components implemented reform guidance, the CSIS study team analyzed contracts 
using contract signed dates to divide the recent reforms into definitive periods for each of the variables 
above. Contract trends were first separated into new contracts started duringUnder Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L) Carter but before any of the recent reforms, to create a baseline from which to compare. Second, 
the variables were divided based on a series of reforms passed near the midpoint of President Obama’s 
first term, each of which contained specific guidance regarding that particular variable. Finally, new 
contracts were divided upon the release of the guidance specifically targeting that variable. The dates for 
each variable period are as follows: 
Competition – Effective Competition 
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 Pre-Better Buying Power 1.0: April 27, 2009–November 2, 2010 
 Better Buying Power 1.0: November 3, 2010–April 23, 2013 
 Better Buying Power 2.0: April 24, 2013–September 21, 2014 
Vendor Size – Small Business Promotion   
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 Pre-Small Business Task Force: April 27, 2009–September 22, 2010 
 Small Business Task Force (SBTF): September 23, 2010–April 23, 2013 
 Better Buying Power 2.0: April 24, 2013–September 21, 2014  
Pricing Mechanism – Fixed Price v. Cost-Plus 
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 Pre-2009 NDAA Section 864: April 27, 2009–March 15, 2011 
 2009 NDAA Section 864: March 16, 2011–April 23, 2013 
 Better Buying Power 2.0: April 24, 2013–September 21, 2014 
Contract Vehicle – Multi-Award Contracts 
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 2008 NDAA Section 843: April 19, 2010–March 1, 2012 
 2009 NDAA Section 863: March 2, 2012–September 21, 2014 
Product or Service Code Category 
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 Better Buying Power 1.0: November 3, 2010–July 30, 2012 
 2012 NDAA Section 808: July 31, 2012–September 21, 2014 
Top Ten Vendor 
 John J. Young, Jr. AT&L Regime: July 21, 2007–April 26, 2009 
 Pre-Small Business Task Force: April 27, 2009–September 22, 2010 
 Small Business Task Force (SBTF): September 23, 2010–April 23, 2013 
 Better Buying Power 2.0: April 24, 2013–September 21, 2014  
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3.2 FPDS Methodology  
See http://csis.org/program/methodology for the full methodology. 
Inherent Restrictions of FPDS 
Since the analysis presented in this report heavily relies on FPDS data, it incurs notable restrictions. 
1. First, contracts awarded as part of overseas contingency operations (OCO) are not separately 
classified in FPDS. As a result, we do not distinguish between contracts funded by base budgets and 
those funded by OCO appropriations. 
2. Second, FPDS includes only prime contracts, and the separate subcontract database has historically 
been radically incomplete, accounting for less than half of the expected obligations. Therefore, only 
prime contract data are included in this report. 
3. Third, reporting regulations require that only unclassified contracts be included in FPDS. We interpret 
this to mean that few, if any, classified contracts are in the database. For DoD, this omits a substantial 
amount of total contract spending, perhaps as much as 10 percent. Such omissions are probably most 
noticeable in R&D contracts. 
Constant Dollars and Fiscal Years 
All dollar amounts in this report are reported as constant Fiscal Year 2014 dollars unless specifically 
noted otherwise.  
Competition 
The study team followed DoD methodology and calculated competition by using two fields: extent of 
competition, which is preferred for contract awards; and fair opportunity, which is preferred for task and 
delivery orders under most indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs). Additionally, to better evaluate the rate of 
“effective competition,” the study team categorizes competitively awarded contracts by the number of 
offers received.101 
Vendor Size 
To analyze the breakdown of competitors in the market into small, medium, and large vendors, the CSIS 
team assigned each vendor in the database to one of these size categories. Any organization designated as 
small by the FPDS database—according to the criteria established by the federal government—was 
categorized as such unless the vendor was a known subsidiary of a larger entity. Due to varying standards 
across sectors, an organization may meet the criteria for being a small business in certain contract actions 
and not in others. The study team did not override these inconsistent entries when calculating the 
distribution of value by vendor size. 
Vendors with annual revenue of more than $3 billion, including those from nonfederal sources, are 
classified as large. This classification is based on the vendor’s most recent revenue figure at time of 
classification. For vendors that have gone out of business or been acquired, this date may be well before 
2013. A joint venture between two or more organizations is treated as a single separate entity, and 
organizations with a large parent are also defined as large. Due to their system integrator role and 
consistent market share, the study team placed the six largest defense contractors (Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and United Technologies Corporation) into a 
separate category called “Big 6 defense vendors.” Any vendor assigned a unique identifier by FPDS that 
is neither small nor large is classified as “medium.” 
In order to identify large vendors, the study team investigated any vendor with total obligations of $500 
million in a single year or $2 billion over the study period. Determining revenues is the most labor-
                                                     




intensive part of the process and involves the use of vendor websites, news articles, various databases, 
and public financial documents. While large vendors are, on rare occasions, reassigned into the middle 
tier, the vast majority of investigations either maintain the status quo or identify small or medium vendors 
that should be classified as large. 
Contract Vehicle 
Determining the contract vehicle required classifying both awards and indefinite delivery vehicles 
(IDVs). While classifying awards is straightforward, classifying IDVs requires the referenced IDV 
contract type field, which is only available via the FPDS web tool. The study team recreates this field by 
automatically looking up the referenced parent IDV for each delivery order. When this lookup is 
unsuccessful, typically because the IDV originated before the study period, the study team relies on tables 
downloaded from the FPDS web tool. This approach may not exactly match the FPDS web tool results, 
but it allows for cross-tabulation and enables emulation of the DoD method for calculating competition. 
For DoD standards, the choice of which field to use when classifying competition is based on vehicle 
type. Many IDVs rely on fair-opportunity standards, while other vehicles and definitive contracts instead 
rely on the traditional extent-competed field. 
Measuring Changes in Product or Service Code Category 
The inherent restrictions of FPDS prevent CSIS from identifying the full range of contracts funded by 
OCO appropriations, and those funded by regular appropriations. As Sec. 808 of the 2012 NDAA 
specifically exempts services contracts funded by OCO transferred to the base budget from the overall 
limitation on service contract obligations, CSIS is unable to measure implementation of that reform with 
sufficient academic rigor. Instead, the study measured what impact the provision had on the larger shifts 
in components acquisition portfolios. Complementing this analysis will be the inclusion of analysis by the 
GAO of DoD’s official metrics and those of the GAO.  
3.3 Explanation of the Horsetail Charts Used in this Paper 
The inertia and cyclical nature of the defense acquisition system is one of the largest challenges to 
examining the influence of policy changes. For example, the highest share of contract obligations is 
awarded during the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. To account for this dynamic, this study has chosen to 
use “horsetail” charts that overlay each of the policy periods on top of one another.  
Categorizing Contracts by Signing Regime 
Splitting recent years into policy regime periods is the first step to studying the effects of new policy, but 
it is not enough to determine which regime was in charge when a contract obligation takes place. After a 
contract has been signed the costs of changing it are inherently higher, no matter whether it misaligns 
with a new policy approach. To account for this significant inertia, the study team classified all contracts 
and task orders by the policy regime responsible at time of signing.102 The starting fiscal year, listed as 
Year 0 in the graph, is different for each of the regimes. The legend below the graph identifies the starting 
year, ending period, and final displayed period for each policy regime. This allowed the study team to 
compare contracting trends between the different regimes at the same point in their regime period 
Because we continue to track longer-duration contracts after the end of a policy regime, there is 
significant temporal overlap on the graph below. The end fiscal year of one policy regime is the starting 
fiscal year for the next one. However, because of the cyclical nature of contracting discussed below, the 
                                                     
102 For indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs), the assignment is made based on when the new task order was signed, as 
indicated by the assignment of a new procurement identifier (PIID), rather than when the base vehicle was created. 
While many of the parameters of an IDV contract are specified when the base vehicle is created, future contracting 
officers have some discretion as to whether and to what extent to use that particular vehicle. 
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study team felt it was more important to compare contracting trends happening, for example, at the start 
of the regime’s third fiscal year than to compare trends occurring in November of 2010.  
Figure 3-1: Example of Horsetail Chart Used In Paper 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
As show in Figure 3-1, the y-axis of the horsetail charts tracks the percent share of monthly obligations 
going to a particular category of contract, in this case contracts not effectively competed. While the 
contract is assigned based on when it was originally signed, the spending is classified based on the month 
in which the obligation occurs. To account for natural variance in monthly contracting spending, 
contracting trends are smoothed using a three-month lagging average (value-weighted). As a side effect of 




4. Overall Department of Defense Trends 
Overall DoD Competition Trends 
Figure 4-1: Overall DoD Not Effective Competition by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
For contracts signed during the Dr. Ashton Carter AT&L period, but before the issuance of BBP 1.0 
guidance, 53 percent of contract obligations were awarded following effective competition, while 34 
percent were awarded without competition. Under BBP 1.0 guidance, there was a slight decrease in the 
competitiveness of the DoD contracting marketplace when compared to before the reforms. Under the 
BBP 1.0 guidance, the share of new start contract obligations awarded without completion grew to 42 
percent. While the rise in no-competition-contracting in spite of guidance to increase competition is 
troubling, there was one positive change during BBP 1.0. For new start contracts signed under BBP 1.0 
guidance, just 9 percent were awarded after competition with just a single offer, a decline from 12 percent 
before BBP 1.0. 
Under the BBP 2.0 guidance, unlike the BBP 1.0 guidance, competition across the Department increased. 
For overall DoD contracts signed under the BBP 2.0 guidance, contract obligations awarded without 
competition fell to 38 percent of total DoD contract obligations, while the share of contract obligations 
awarded with effective competition increased to 53 percent.  
Figure 4-1 shows that overall DoD contract obligations shows effective rates of competition for overall 
DoD contract obligations largely follow the same cyclical pattern in the first two and a half years of a 
policy’s regimes. For contracts signed in the fourth quarter of the first year’s regime, 59 percent were 
awarded without effective completion prior to BBP, 55 percent under BBP 1.0, and 59 percent under BBP 
2.0, suggesting the successful implementation to increase competition in the defense industrial base. For 
contact obligations awarded in the fourth quarter of the second year of a policy regime, effective 
completion rates slightly declined for all three periods when compared to the first year: effective 
competition rates under BBP 2.0 fell to 52 percent, under BBP 1.0 effective competition fell to 50 
percent, and prior to BBP, 51 percent.  
Beginning around the Year Three, Q2 of the various policy regimes, trends between Carter obligations 
prior to BBP and BBP 1.0 begin to substantially diverge. In the fourth quarter of the third fiscal year, 
effective competition rates for contract obligations signed under BBP 1.0 guidance fell to just 37 percent. 
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Meanwhile, shares of obligations for contracts awarded after effective competition that were signed under 
the Dr. Carter AT&L regime prior to the issuance of the BBP guidance at that same period in the regime 
remained around 50 percent or higher in the later years. The share of contract obligations awarded under 
effective competition for contracts signed under BBP 1.0 continues to fluctuate in the quarters beyond 
Y3Q4, suggesting the trends are not shaped by the cyclical nature of contracting.  
Figure 4-2: Overall DoD Cost Plus by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
For contracts signed prior to the issuance of final guidance for the implementation of Section 864 of the 
2009 NDAA, a strong majority (68 percent) were awarded under fixed-price contract types, with most of 
the remaining (26 percent) awarded under cost-reimbursement contract types.  
There was a slight rise in the shares of contract obligations awarded under fixed in the post-2009 NDAA/ 
Section 864 pre-BBP 2.0 period and those signed in the post-BBP 2.0 period. For contracts signed under 
the 2009 NDAA Section 864, 76 percent of contract obligations were fixed price. The share of fixed-price 
contract obligations continued to grow slightly under BBP 2.0, rising to 80 percent. Under the BBP 2.0 
guidance, use of time and materials (T&M) contract types declined, falling from 2 percent pre-BBP 2.0 to 
1 percent post-BBP 2.0, reflecting guidance in BBP 2.0 to scale back the use of T&M contract types. 
The share of contract obligations awarded as cost-plus contracts largely follows a similar trend: a gradual 
increase during the first two years, before a large increase in the Q3 of the third year, followed by a 
decline in the fourth quarter. Beyond Y3Q3, you see a similar rise and fall around the third and fourth 
quarters of the fourth year.  
The trends for contracts signed during the Obama administration, both before and after the 
implementation of the 2009 NDAA Sec. 864 guidance, follow the trend outline above. At both the start of 
the Dr. Carter AT&L regime, and after the implementation of the NDAA guidance, around 11 percent of 
overall DoD contract obligations were for cost-reimbursement contracts. By the quarter four of the second 
year, the share of contract obligations for cost plus increased slightly faster under the NDAA guidance 
than the pre-reform Dr. Carter regime (NDAA: 19 percent, Carter: 18 percent). In Q3 of that third year of 
the reform period, the share of cost-plus contract obligations reached 52 percent without the NDAA 
guidance and 39 percent under it. After that quarter, the two reform periods largely followed the trends 
outlined above and shown in Figure 4-2.  
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The share of contract obligations for cost-plus new-start contracts signed under the BBP 2.0 guidance 
follows the gradual increase over the first two years similar to the other reform periods.  
Analysis of the data suggests that the cylical nature of contracting has some correlation to the shares of 
contract obligations awarded under a fixed-price mechanism. As shown in Figure 4-3, the share of fixed-
price contract obligations follow a historical trend. For the first two years of a reform period, the share of 
contract obligations awarded under fix-priced mechanisms remains relatively steady. Around the third 
quarter of the third year, the share of fixed price contract obligations falls substantially, before recovering 
in the first and second quarters of the four year only to fall again.  
Figure 4-3: Overall DoD Fixed Price by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Overall DoD Vendor Size Trends 
Prior to the implementation of BBP 2.0, the share of contract obligations going toward small businesses 
remained steady. Under the BBP 2.0 guidance, the share of contract obligations awarded to small 
businesses rose to 25 percent of contracts across the Department. This increase for small businesses came 
as large vendors contract obligations fell. Prior to the implementation of the SBTF and BBP 2.0 guidance, 
large vendors represented 36 percent of overall DoD contract obligations. Under the SBTF guidance, that 
share fell to 30 percent, before falling even further to 27 percent under BBP 2.0 The share of contract 
obligations to medium vendors remained at 23 percent throughout SBTF, but then increased to 26 percent 
after BBP 2.0. 
Figure 4-4 shows that analyzing overall DoD contracting trends by the years since the start of a regime’s 
first fiscal year shows that the majority of small businesses contracting obligations are awarded in the 
fourth quarter the fiscal year. Prior to any reforms, the Department awarded 27 percent of new start 
contract obligations to small vendors at the end of its first fiscal year of the Carter AT&L regime. While 
that share fell to 25 percent under the SBTF guidelines, the share of obligations for small vendors 
increased to 31 percent in the fourth quarter of the first year under BBP 2.0. For all the study periods, 
there were subsequent declines in the first and second quarters of the second fiscal year, followed in most 
cases with growth in the share for small businesses in the third quarter. 
While contract obligations for small vendors lagged behind pre-reform trends under the SBTF guidelines 
for the first year and a half, there was a small vendor resurgence beginning in the second quarter of the 
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second year. Finally, under BBP 2.0 small vendors saw higher shares of contract obligations than at the 
same points in the other reforms. For example, under BBP 2.0 the Department awarded 29 percent of 
overall DoD contract obligations during the fourth quarter of the second year when compared to that same 
point in the SBTF and the pre-reform period, when the Department awarded 26 percent and 24 percent 
respectfully. This is a positive early trend that suggests the protection and requirement to increase the 
share of the share of contract obligations for small businesses suggests the small business reforms may 
have been better implemented within the components that previous reform efforts.  
Figure 4-4: Overall DoD Small Business by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
Overall DoD Product or Service Code Category Trends 
Between reform periods, there were large shifts in the composition of products, services, and R&D 
contract obligations for overall DoD. During the Young AT&L regime, 50 percent of contract obligations 
were awarded to products, 7 percent for R&D, and 42 percent for services. Under the beginnings of the 
Carter AT&L regime prior to BBP 1.0, just 43 percent of contract obligations were awarded for products, 
while 9 percent went to R&D and 48 percent to services. 
Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, the share of contract obligations going toward products increased to 52 
percent, while R&D fell to 7 percent and services to 41 percent. Under the Section 808 guidance, overall 
DoD saw a slight resurgence in services contract spending as a share of the portfolio, rising to 44 percent 
of overall DoD contracting obligations while R&D contracting obligations held steady.  
Implementation of 2012 NDAA Section 808 
Based on internal calculations, DoD identified the overall cap on services contracts restricted by Sec. 808 
of the 2012 NDAA as $56.47 billion in FY2012. In order to meet the statuary restrictions placed on 
overall DoD services contracting spending, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued targets to each 
of the components for how much they could spend on services that year. However, the official guidance 
came three-quarters of the way through the fiscal year, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA all 
exceeded those targets, overspending their caps by $3.06 billion in total. Meanwhile, all other defense 
agencies underspent the targets by $0.71 billion. When combined with the $1.73 billion DoD set aside for 
unexpected costs, the Department internally reported overspending the cap by $1.34 billion in 2012. 
GAO’s assessment found that DoD inconsistently applied their methodology in the calculations of the 
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caps and aggregate services contracting spending, resulting in an additional $0.38 billion in services 
contracting not accounted for; pushing the total amount overspent to $1.72 billion.103  
For FY2013, DoD calculated the aggregate spending limit for services contracts as $57.46 billion. With 
more time for the components to take the necessary steps, the Department’s official reports state that it 
underspent the FY2013 cap by $1.81 billion. GAO analysis identified methodological flaws in those 
calculations, similar to those found in an analysis of FY2012, resulting in more services contracting 
spending than reported. While still under the caps, the GAO report identified an additional $1.32 billion 
in services contracts not accounted for by the Department. The unaccounted spending brought the 
Department down from $1.81 billion under the cap to just $490 million.104  
Overall DoD Contract Vehicle Trends  
Figure 4-5: Overall DoD Multiple-Award by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Prior to the start of the Obama administration, the majority of contract obligations under the Young 
AT&L regime were awarded under either a definitive (41 percent) or single-award (40 percent) contract 
vehicle. At the start of the Carter AT&L regime, but prior to implementation of Sec. 863 of the 2009 
NDAA, contract obligations for multi-award contracts increased from just 13 percent during the Young 
regime to 22 percent. Meanwhile, the share of contract obligations awarded under definitive contract 
vehicles fell from 41 percent to 32 percent.  
After the implementation of the final Sec. 864 guidance, the share of contract obligations awarded under 
multi-award contract vehicles across the Department fell to 15 percent with subsequent rises in definitive 
(38 percent) and “Other IDV” (2 percent) contract vehicles. Under the Sec. 863 guidance, the trends seen 
in the Sec. 864 reforms remain largely the same.  
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As shown in Figure 4-5, the share of contract obligations awarded under multiple-award vehicles is 
largely cyclical for only the first three years of a regime with the exception of those contract signed under 
the Carter regime prior to reform efforts. While the trends for the pre-reform Carter regime started out 
similar to the cyclical trends for the other reform regimes, beginning in the fourth quarter of the first fiscal 
year (Y1Q4), the share of contract obligations awarded under multiple-award vehicles rapidly increased, 
rising from an average of 17 percent of overall DoD contract obligations beforehand, to 28 percent in 
Y1Q4. Beyond Y1Q4, the share of contract obligations awarded under multiple-award vehicles continued 
to steadily increase, reaching 34 percent in the fourth quarter of the second year.  
Overall DoD Top Ten Vendors Trends 
Figure 4-6: Overall DoD Top Ten Vendors by Reform Period 
 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
For overall DoD, the largest five defense vendors (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, 
Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman) all remained in the top five vendors throughout the entirety of the 
study period. While they shuffled positions between reform periods, none fell lower than fifth. The sixth 
postiion rotated between BAE Systems, Oshkosh, and L3 Communications. Finally, Figure 4-7 shows 
that over the course of the entire study period, Kellogg Brown & Root, Bechtecl, Fluour, Health Net, and 
Humana all entered the top ten overall vendors during one reform period, before falling and failing to 
reach the top ten vendors list again. 
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5. Army Contracting Trends  
Army Competition Contracting Trends 
Figure 5-1: Army Effective Competition by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Of the DoD components, the Army has historically had slightly higher average effective competition rates 
than the other military services. The data show that for Army contracts signed under the Dr. Carter AT&L 
regime prior to BBP 1.0, 56 percent of contract obligations were awarded following effective 
competition. The share of contracting obligations awarded without competition was just 28 percent. 
Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, the Army saw a slight decline in the competitiveness of the contracting 
environment. Throughout the BBP 1.0 period, the shares of contracts signed under BBP following 
effective competition were 50 percent. The share of contract obligations awarded without competition 
meanwhile rose to 37 percent. Similar to the overall DoD trend, contract obligations awarded after 
competition with just a single offer begin to decline at the start of BBP 2.0. 
Figure 5-1 shows that beginning with BBP 2.0 guidance, the Army returned to the effective competition 
rates seen before the recent acquisition reforms. After the issuance of the BBP 2.0 final guidelines, the 
share of contract obligations awarded following effective competition rose to 56 percent of new start 
Army contracting obligations. Shares of new contracts awarded without competition, or awarded after just 
a single offer, fell to 34 percent and 9 percent, respectively. 
Army Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends  
Figure 5-2 shows that trends within the Army track closely with those of overall DoD. For contract 
actions under those contracts prior to final implementation of 2009 NDAA Section 864, only 13 percent 
were awarded under cost-reimbursement contract types, while 81 percent were fixed price. For contract 
actions under those pre-2009 NDAA Section 864 contracts that went into effect “throughout” the post-
2009 NDAA Section 864 period, 21 percent were cost reimbursement, while 72 percent were fixed price.  
Like overall DoD, the mix of contract pricing mechanism types was largely unchanged between contracts 
signed in the post-2009 NDAA Section 864/pre-BBP 2.0 period and those signed in the post-BBP 2.0 
period: 16 percent of contract obligations in both periods were awarded under cost-reimbursement 
contract types, while fixed price rose from 80 percent to 83 percent, largely drawing from T&M. 
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Figure 5-2: Army Fixed Price by Years Since Start of Regime's First Fiscal Year 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Army Vendor Size Contracting Trends 
Figure 5-3: Army Small Business by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Over the course of the study timeframe, the Army experienced large shifts in the defense industrial base, 
as measured by size of vendor. Prior to the SBTF and BBP 2.0, the Army awarded 35 percent of contract 
obligations to large vendors and just 13 percent to the Big 6 vendors. With the implementation of BBP 
2.0, the share of contract obligations going to large vendors fell to 19 percent, while the share for the Big 
6 defense vendors increased to 20 percent. As shown in Figure 5-3, small vendors saw incremental 
increases throughout the study timeframe, increasing from 21 percent of Army contracts before the SBTF, 
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23 percent throughout the SBTF, and 29 percent since the introduction of BBP 2.0. However, it remains 
to be seen how much of the shift can be accounted for as a result of the drawdowns in Afghanistan and 
withdrawal from Iraq when compared to the implementation of any acquisition reform guidance.  
Army Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
While the Army trends match those seen for “Overall DoD,” they differ substantially in their scale. Under 
the Dr. Carter AT&L regime, but prior to any reform efforts, the Army awarded just 38 percent of 
contract obligations to products. Fifty-seven percent of Army contract obligations during this period went 
to services, and just 5 percent for R&D. Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, there was a similar rise in Army 
products contracting, as seen for overall DoD, increasing to 44 percent.  
During the 2012 NDAA Sec. 808 guidance reform period, products contract obligations fell to 42 percent 
of Army contract obligations. Meanwhile, Army service contracts increased to 57 percent of the share of 
Army new start contract obligations.  
Implementation of 2012 NDAA Section 808  
GAO analysis of the Army’s implementation of Section 808 found that the Army failed to solicit 
command inputs, set command spending targets, or even monitor command spending on services 
contracting. As a result, the Army overspent its target by $2.37 in FY2012 and $2.69 billion in 
FY2013.105 GAO found that the Army failed to prioritize service requirements or monitor spending 
throughout the year.106 This merits further monitoring as it suggests that the Army has not come close to 
implementation of Sec. 808 guidance.  
Army Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
Figure 5-4: Army Multiple-Award by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
As shown in Figure 5-4, the Army contract vehicle trends only loosely resemble the overall DoD trends. 
Prior to the Obama administration, the Army awarded 15 percent of contract obligations under multiple 
                                                     




awards, 40 percent under single awards, and 38 percent under definitive contract vehicles. Similarly to 
overall DoD, at the beginning of the Dr. Carter AT&L regime, but prior to any reforms, multiple award 
rose as a share of Army contract obligations (32 percent) while definitive contract obligations fell (31 
percent). Similar to overall DoD, under Sec. 843 of the 2012 guidance the share of contract obligations 
awarded under multiple-award contract vehicles fell 20 percent. Under Sec 863 of the 2009 NDAA 
guidance, that share fell further, to 17 percent. Unlike the overall DoD trends, shares of Army contract 
obligations awarded under a single-award contract vehicle fell during the pre-reform Dr. Carter regime 
and remained relatively steady through the remaining study periods.  
Army Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends  
Figure 5-5: Overall Army Top Ten Vendors by Reform Period 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
Unlike overall DoD trends, there was much greater turnover within the top ten Army vendors between 
reform periods. The only vendor to remain in the top five Army vendors during all four periods was 
General Dynamics, while Raytheon remained in the top five for three of the four periods. You also see a 
different number-one vendor during all four reform periods as BAE Systems, Oshkosh, Lockheed Martin, 
and Boeing all topping the Army’s contracting obligations at one point. Finally, Figure 5-6 shows 
Kellogg Brown & Root, Fluor, and ITT all entered the top ten, only to fall off the list in future reform 
periods. The large drop in Army contract obligations may account for some of this turnover.  
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6 Navy Contracting Trends  
Navy Competition Contracting Trends 
Figure 6-1: Navy Effective Competition by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
At the start of the Dr. Carter’s AT&L regime, Navy contracting was less competitive than for overall 
DoD. For contract actions in the pre-BBP period, 46 percent of Navy contract obligations were awarded 
after effective competition—an extended observation of contract actions under those pre-BBP contracts 
throughout the study time frame shows that the share of contract obligations decreased to 42 percent. 
Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, Navy contracting became an even less competitive marketplace. For 
contracts that went into effect before BBP 2.0, 51 percent of contract obligations were awarded after 
effective competition. That rate fell to 45 percent for contract obligations under pre-BBP 2.0 contracts 
throughout the study time frame. Similar to the overall trends, the data shown in Figure 6-1 the start in the 
decline in contracts awarded after receiving only one offer after the issuance of the BBP 1.0 guidance. 
Under the BBP 2.0 guidance, the trends seen in BBP 1.0 begin to reverse for contracts signed after April 
24, 2013, as the Navy awarded 49 percent of new start contract obligations without competition and 42 
percent following effective competition. With the decline in vendors capable of building Naval vessels, it 
is possible that a few large contracts might be responsible for the trends seen above.  
Navy Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends 
Figure 6-2 below shows that trends within the Navy also largely followed the pattern seen in overall DoD. 
For contract actions signed prior to 2009, 39 percent of contract obligations were awarded under cost-
reimbursement contract types increased to 35 percent, 61 percent were awarded under fixed price.  
Like overall DoD, the mix of contract pricing mechanism types was largely unchanged between contracts 
signed in the 2009 NDAA Section 864/pre-BBP 2.0 period and those signed in the post-BBP 2.0 period: 
approximately 25 percent of contract obligations in both periods were awarded under cost-reimbursement 
contract types, while fixed price accounted for 74 percent in both periods. 
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Figure 6-2: Navy Fixed Price by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year  
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
Navy Vendor Size Contracting Trends 
Figure 6-3: Navy Small Business by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Before the implementation of any of the recent acquisition reform efforts, 61 percent of contract 
obligations were awarded to large and Big 6 defense vendors. For contracts signed under the SBTF 
guidelines, the share of contract obligations for the Big 6 defense vendors increased to 38 percent. The 
share of contract obligations for small vendors meanwhile was just 17 percent throughout. The share for 
large vendors fell from 30 percent to 6 percent.  
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Figure 6-3 shows that under the BBP 2.0 guidelines, small businesses made a resurgence, increasing to 23 
percent of new start contract obligations. The Big 6 defense vendors’ share of contract obligations fell 
from 38 percent to 29 percent. Large vendors remained steady at a 26 percent share of contract 
obligations, while medium vendors increased from 19 percent to 22 percent. 
Navy Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
For new start contracts signed under the Dr. Carter AT&L regime, but prior to the recent reform efforts, 
47 percent of Navy contract obligations went to products, 9 percent to R&D, and 44 percent to services. 
Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, the Navy followed a similar trend to the overall Department, seeing an 
increase in products and a decrease in services. Under BBP 1.0, the Navy awarded 57 percent of contract 
obligations for products and 37 percent for services. Unlike the overall DoD, the Navy saw a significant 
decline in R&D contracting, falling from 9 percent to just 6 percent of the Navy’s share of new start 
contract obligations. 
Under 2012 NDAA Sec. 808 guidance, the Navy saw a decline in the share of contract obligations 
awarded for products, and an increase in the share awarded to services, similar to that of the overall DoD. 
For new contracts signed under this guidance, 50 percent were awarded for products, 43 percent for 
services, and 7 percent for R&D.  
Section 808 2012 NDAA 
GAO found that the Navy solicited command inputs, and monitored command spending, but failed to set 
command spending targets on services contracts. In FY2012 the Navy exceeded its target by $0.77 billion 
and in FY2013 underspent its target by $0.52 billion.107 
Navy Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
Figure 6-4: Navy Multiple-Award by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
Figure 6-4 shows Navy contract vehicle trends do not closely resemble the overall DoD trends. 
Throughout all of the study periods, definitive contracts remain the most common contract vehicle, 




averaging 53 percent of Navy contract awards since the start of the John Young AT&L regime. Of note, 
the Navy showed progress in increasing the share of contract obligations awarded under a multiple-award 
contract vehicle under the Sec. 863 of the 2009 NDAA guidance after falling from previous levels during 
the 2008 NDAA 
Navy Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends 
Figure 6-5: Navy Top 10 Vendors by Regime Period 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Analysis of Navy contract obligations in Figure 6-5 shows that, while the Navy saw little movement by 
new vendors into the top ten, there were significant shifts within the rankings. First, Lockheed Martin 
usurped General Dynamics as the Navy’s top vendor at the start of the Dr. Carter regime, and hasn’t yet 
relinquished that spot. Second, Northrop Grumman spinning off its shipbuilding capability to form 
Huntington Ingalls Industries Incorporated had long-term repercussions on the top-ten rankings.108 By the 
introduction of BBP 2.0, Huntington Ingalls had overtaken Northrop Grumman’s ranking. Furthermore, 
had the spinoff not occurred, Northrop Grumman would have usurped Lockheed Martin as the top Navy 
vendor. Beyond Northrop Grumman and Huntington Ingalls, Raytheon, Boeing, and General Dynamics 
round out the top-five Navy vendors.  
                                                     
108 The appearance of contract obligations for Huntington Ingalls during the Young and Carter pre-SBTF periods, 
before the spinoff occurred, is a result of the methodological decision to analyze the entirety of contract obligations 
during those periods. For example, if the Navy signed a shipbuilding contract with Northrop Grumman in 2008 that 
included funds beyond March 31, 2011, those contracting obligations would be awarded to HII.  
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7. Air Force Contracting Trends 
Air Force Competition Contracting Trends 
Before BBP 1.0, the Air Force contracting environment was less competitive, compared to the rest of 
DoD. For both contract actions during the pre-BBP period, and throughout the study time frame, the Air 
Force awarded 52 percent of contract obligations without competition. Of note, while the rest of the DoD 
components began decreasing the shares of contracts awarded with just a single-offer competition during 
BBP 1.0, that share in the Air Force was already below 10 percent prior to BBP 1.0 guidance. Under the 
BBP 1.0 guidance, the Air Force failed to improve their already-below-average rate of effective 
competition. For contracts signed under the BBP 1.0 guidance, the Air Force awarded 63 percent of total 
contract obligations without competition. While the Air Force awarded only 5 percent of total new start 
contracts with just a single offer, the rate of effective competition fell to just 32 percent. 
Figure 7-1 shows that under the BBP 2.0 guidance, the Air Force saw small improvements in the 
competitiveness of its marketplace, awarding only 58 percent of new start contract obligations without 
competition. Over that same period, they awarded 34 percent of new start contract obligations following 
effective competition. While this is an improvement from BBP 1.0, the Air Force is still substantially less 
competitive than the rest of the Department. 
Figure 7-1: Air Force Not Effective Competition by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Air Force Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends 
Figure 7-2 below shows that while the trend within Air Force contract obligations follows the same 
pattern as overall DoD, the magnitude of the shift is significantly smaller. For contracts signed pre-2009 
NDAA Section 864, 25 percent of contract obligations were awarded under cost-reimbursement contract 
types, compared to 30 percent for contract obligations going into effect post-2009 NDAA Section 864, 
while use of fixed price declined slightly, from 70 percent to 66 percent. 
There was actually a small shift in pricing mechanism usage between contracts signed in the post-2009 
NDAA Section 864/pre-BBP 2.0 period and those signed in the post-BBP 2.0 period: use of fixed-price 
contract types declined from 73 percent to 71 percent, while cost reimbursement increased from 25 
percent to 28 percent. 
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Figure 7-2: Air Force Fixed Price by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Air Force Vendor Size Contracting Trends  
Figure 7-3: Air Force Small Business by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Of all the military components, the Air Force has historically awarded the largest share of contract 
obligations to the Big 6 defense vendors. Figure 7-3 shows that before the recent acquisition reforms, the 
Air Force awarded 43 percent of new start contract obligations to the Big 6. Meanwhile, small vendors 
received 16 percent of Air Force contract obligations. Under the SBTF guidelines, the shares for the Big 6 
continued to grow at the expense of small vendors. Throughout the SBTF regime, 49 percent of new start 
Air Force contract obligations were awarded to the Big 6, while small vendors received just 13 percent.  
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Under BBP 2.0, small vendors made a resurgence, growing from 13 percent under the SBTF guidelines to 
19 percent. The Big 6 defense vendors’ share of new start Air Force contract obligations decreased from 
49 percent to 36 percent. Under BBP 2.0, the Air Force saw the growth in the share awarded to medium 
vendors for the first time in the study period. Before and during the SBTF guidelines, medium vendors 
received 18 percent of contract obligations, before growing to 26 percent under the BBP 2.0 guidelines.  
Air Force Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
The Air Force contracting trends do not closely resemble the overall DoD trends. For contracts signed 
under the Dr. Carter AT&L regime prior to the recent reforms, 32 percent were awarded for products, 23 
percent toward R&D, and 46 percent for services. Under the BBP 1.0 guidance, the share of new start 
contracts awarded for products increased to 50 percent, while R&D’s share decreased to just 12 percent. 
Meanwhile, the share of Air Force contract obligations for services fell to 37 percent during this period.  
Under the 2012 Sec. 808 guidance, the share of new start contract obligations for services increased to 49 
percent, while products fell to 35 percent. During this period, the share of Air Force contract obligations 
for R&D saw a slight resurgence, increasing to 15 percent.  
Implementation of 2012 NDAA Section 808  
GAO found that of all the military services, the Air Force best implemented guidance for complying with 
the Sec. 808 guidance. In FY2013, Air Force leadership solicited command input, set command spending 
targets, and monitored command spending on services contracts throughout the year. The Air Force’s 
efforts worked, as evidenced by the fact that they underspent their target by $2.83 billion in FY2013, 
more than all of the other components combined. This trend stands in sharp contrast to an increase in 
overall Air Force services contracting, which emphasizes that the Section 808 standards only cover 
certain forms of services contracts.109 
Air Force Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
Figure 7-4: Air Force Single-Award by Year’s Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
  
                                                     




The Air Force contract vehicle trends do not largely reflect the overall DoD trends. Figure 7-4 shows that 
under the Dr. Carter regime, but prior to reform, the Air Force awarded 36 percent of contracts under 
definitive vehicles, 11 percent under multi-award, 47 percent under single award, and 1 percent under 
other IDVs. Under the 2008 Sec. 843 guidance, the shares largely remained constant with a slight 
decrease in single awards (44 percent) and a rise in other IDVs (4 percent).  
Under the 2009 NDAA Sec. 863 guidance, the study team observed substantial shifts in contract vehicle 
usage. During this period, the share of contract obligations awarded under a single-award vehicle fell to 
just 34 percent while the share for definitive contracts rose to 43 percent. Other IDVs continued to grow 
in shares of Air Force contract obligations from 4 percent to 9 percent.  
Air Force Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends 
Figure 7-5: Air Force Top Ten Vendors by Reform Period 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Compared to the other components, Figure 7-5 shows little movement by vendors into and out of the top-
ten rankings. Throughout the period analyzed, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, L3 
Communications, and Raytheon remained in the top six. Beyond the top six, United Technologies 
Corporation, General Atomics, and MIT all made regular appearances in the top ten. In recent years, 
United Launch Alliance, the joint rocket venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin, has become a 
top-six Air Force vendor.  
Whereas General Dynamics had previously been a regular top-ten Air Force vendor, it has fallen off the 
list since the introduction of the SBTF guidelines. Computer Sciences Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton, 




8. Defense Logistics Agency Contracting Trends 
DLA Competition Contracting Trends 
Under the recent round of acquisition reform efforts, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) improved on 
already-strong effective competition rates. Under the Carter regime prior to BBP 1.0, DLA awarded 69 
percent of contract obligations following effective competition. Under BBP 1.0, that rate rose to 76 
percent of contract obligations. That rate remained steady with the issuance of BBP 2.0, as DLA awarded 
75 percent of new start contract obligations following effective competition. 
DLA Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends 
Over 98 percent of DLA contract obligations were awarded under fixed-price contract types in all periods, 
reflecting the fact that DLA predominantly uses contracts to purchase commercial goods and 
commodities such as fuel. 
DLA Vendor Size Contracting Trends 
Figure 8-1: DLA Small Vendor by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
The share of DLA’s contract obligations for small vendors increased, but only after the implementation of 
BBP 2.0. Figure 8-1 shows that the share of obligations awarded to small vendors remained constant at 20 
percent before and after SBTF but grew to 25 percent after BBP 2.0. Medium vendors’ share of 
obligations grew from 25 percent to 29 percent, before declining to 25 percent after BBP 2.0. Large 
vendors’ share declined from 50 percent pre-SBTF to 46 percent after SBTF, and held relatively steady 
(45 percent) after BBP 2.0. 
DLA Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
The recent reforms had a negligible impact on DLA product or service contracting trends. For all study 
periods, products accounted for an average of 95 percent of all DLA contracting obligations.  
Implementation of 2012 NDAA Section 808  
GAO analysis of DLA services contract spending found that DLA exceeded its targets in both FY2012 
and FY2013, and had no command-driven plan for implementing the guidance. The lack of command 
guidance is illustrated by the following comment in the GAO Report on Section 808 guidance, “The DLA 
financial management official that we spoke with was not aware of the Section 808 guidance that set 
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contract services spending target for each component, and therefore took no action to manage to the 
spending target in the guidance.”110 While DLA overwhelmingly contracts for products, the lack of even 
the most basic knowledge on service contract spending targets is troubling.  
DLA Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
Prior to any recent reform efforts, DLA awarded the largest share of contract obligations under single-
award contract vehicles. Under the 2008 NDAA Sec. 843, there were no notable shifts in the vehicle 
trends. Beginning with implementation of 2009 NDAA Sec. 863, there was a small shift away from 
single-award contract vehicles. Falling from an average of 82 percent under all other periods, DLA 
awarded 76 percent of contract obligations under a single-award vehicle during this period. There were 
subsequent increases in the shares of other IDVs (3 percent) and purchase orders (9 percent). There were 
no notable shifts in the multi-award vehicle trends during any of the reform periods.  
DLA Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends 
Figure 8-2: DLA Top Ten Vendors by Reform Period 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Because the agency largely contracting for fuel and other products, DLA’s top-ten vendors do not closely 
resemble any of the other services. Figure 8-2 shows that throughout the study period, Royal Dutch Shell, 
AmerisourceBergen, and Supreme Group all made frequent appearances in the top-five vendors. Beyond 
the top-three vendors, McKesson, Valero Energy, and Cardinal Health were all top DLA vendors beyond 
their big three.  
On the DLA top-ten lists, vendors frequently enter the list for one to two reform periods before falling 
from the list. For example, Red Star Enterprises, Bahrain Petroleum Company, International Oil Trading, 
Refinery Associates of Texas, World Fuel Services Corporation, and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
all make appearances in the top before disappearing in subsequent periods. The drawdowns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan can account for some of the rapid appearance before a subsequent disappearance. It bears 
further monitoring if the appearance of Anham and National Fuel in the top during the latest study period 
is a long-term trend, or another example of same circumstance.  
                                                     
110 Ibid., 16 
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9. Missile Defense Agency Contracting Trends 
MDA Competition Contracting Trends 
Within MDA, there were notable shifts in the contracting landscape during the periods of acquisition 
reform. MDA awarded 58 percent of contract obligations without competition in the years before the 
issuance of the final BBP 1.0 guidelines. Looking at contract actions under those pre-BBP contracts 
across the entire study timeframe, that rate rises to 79 percent.  
As the BBP 1.0 reforms went into effect, the share of contract obligations awarded without competition 
fell to 50 percent throughout the study timeframe. When the BBP 2.0 guidelines were issued, contract 
obligations awarded without competition began to rise again (62 percent during BBP 2.0).  
MDA Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends 
Figure 9-1: MDA Cost Plus by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis  
Figure 9-1 shows that unlike those of any other major DoD component, an overwhelming majority of 
MDA contract obligations are awarded under cost-reimbursement contract types. For contracts signed 
pre-2009 NDAA Section 864, there was minimal difference in pricing mechanism usage between pre-
2009 NDAA Section 864 contract actions (93 percent cost reimbursement, 5 percent fixed price) and 
contract actions that went into effect post-2009 NDAA Section 864 (91 percent cost reimbursement, 8 
percent fixed price). 
Use of fixed-price contract types increased dramatically in contracts signed post-2009 NDAA/pre-BBP 
2.0, with the share of obligations awarded under fixed-price contract types rising to 26 percent, while cost 
reimbursement fell to 74 percent. This trend was reversed in contracts signed post-BBP 2.0, as the new 
guidance reduced emphasizing using fixed-price contract types: the share of obligations awarded under 
fixed-price contract types fell to 19 percent, while the share for cost reimbursement rose to 81 percent. 
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MDA Vendor Size Contracting Trends 
Figure 9-2: MDA Small Business by Years Since Start of Regime’s First Fiscal Year 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
MDA saw the strongest reaction to policy guidance throughout the study period in terms of composition 
of vendor base. Before the implementation of any reform efforts, small vendors were awarded just 5 
percent of contract obligations. After the implementation of the SBTF guidelines, that share increased to 7 
percent. After BBP 2.0 was introduced, that share further increased to 17 percent.  
Throughout the study period, there was also a rise in medium-vendor share and a decline in Big 6 vendor 
share of obligations. Before reforms, the Big 6 and medium vendors were awarded 92 percent and 2 
percent, respectively. Under the SBTF guidelines, the Big 6 fell to 74 percent of contract obligations, 
while medium vendors grew to 11 percent. Under BBP 2.0 guidelines, the Big 6 fell to 67 percent of 
contract obligations, while medium vendors remained steady at 11 percent.  
MDA Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
MDA undertook a larger shift in its acquisition portfolio than any of the other components. 
For contracts signed under the Dr. Carter regime prior to any reforms, 91 percent of contract obligations 
went to R&D, 3 percent for products, and 6 percent for services contracts. After the issuance of the BBP 
1.0 guidance, the share of contract obligations for products and services increased to 19 percent and 15 
percent, respectably. The share of contract obligations for R&D meanwhile fell to 65 percent.  
After the issuance of the Sec. 808 guidance, the share of MDA contract obligations for R&D continued to 
fall (52 percent) as the share for products increased (36 percent). Of note, MDA was the only one of two 
components to see a decrease in the share of contract obligations awarded for services, after the issuance 
of the Sec. 808 guidance to decrease services contracts.111  
                                                     
111 GAO did analyze MDA’s specific implementation of the Section 808 guidance. They fell within the “All Defense 
Agencies” category that was $0.71 billion below their spending target in FY2012 and $2.25 billion in FY2013.  
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MDA Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
Figure 9-3: MDA Multiple-Award Contract Obligations 
Source: FPDS; CSIS Analysis 
Of all the major components, MDA saw the largest shifts in contract vehicle usage during the study 
period. Prior to the implementation of the two reform periods, MDA awarded a majority of contract 
obligations under definitive contract vehicles. Under the 2008 Sec. 843 guidance, the shares of contract 
obligations awarded under definitive contract vehicles fell from 71 percent under the pre-reform Carter 
regime to 59 percent. Multi-award contracts increased from less than 1 percent to 12 percent over that 
same time period.  
After the implementation of the 2009 Sec. 863 guidance, MDA’s trend away from definitive contract 
vehicles continued, falling to just 37 percent of contract obligations. The trend toward multiple-award 
contracts did not continue, however, as they fell from 12 percent to just 6 percent. The move away from 
multiple-award and definitive contract vehicles came as MDA moved heavily toward single-award 
contract vehicles during this period. During the previous reform period, single-award contract vehicles 
represented just 29 percent of MDA contract obligations. In the final reform study period, they rose to 54 
percent of MDA contract obligations.  
MDA Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends  
Analysis of the top-ten MDA vendors highlights their broader shift away from an almost exclusive R&D 
industrial base. While the top five vendors were, and are to this day, largely dominated by four of the 
biggest five defense vendors, the bottom half of the top ten was more varied. Vendors in the top ten 
ranged from Utah State University to the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. With the move toward more 
products and services, vendors such as Orbital Sciences, Sparta Inc., and L3 Communications have all 
moved into the top-ten MDA vendors.  
Companies that fell from the top-ten MDA vendors include: Teledyne, BAE Systems, Computer Sciences 
Corporation, Engineering Management Concepts, Inc., Corvid Technologies, Inc., Charles Stark Dapper 
Laboratory, CACI, Utah State University, Teradyne, BCF Solutions, Inc., and Johns Hopkins University. 
In addition to those companies that fell out of the top-ten vendors permanently, Boeing was not a top-ten 




Figure 9-4: MDA Top Ten Vendors by Reform Period 




10. Military Health Programs Contracting Trends 
Military Health Competition Contracting Trends 
In the years before the issuance of the BBP 2.0 guidance, 99 percent of military health contracts were 
awarded following effective competition. In 2014, military health programs were awarded $1.52 billion in 
no-competition contract obligations, the first substantial awarding of contract obligations without 
competition for the military health programs. CSIS plans to consult with industry experts to identify if 
this was a one-year trend, or a sign of a shift to noncompetitive contracting in the military health 
programs. 
Military Health Pricing Mechanism Contracting Trends 
Pricing-mechanism usage fluctuated dramatically for military health, largely the result of how few dollars 
(relatively speaking) were obligated under those programs until recently. It is thus difficult to discern if 
there are real shifts in pricing-mechanism usage between the periods, or if it is the result of increasing 
contracting activity and a changing contracting mission. The study team will investigate further, in 
consultation with experts, to better understand contracting behavior within military health in recent years. 
Military Health Vendor Size Contracting Trends 
Military health, while experiencing the same general trend toward small and medium vendors, was 
uniquely skewed toward medium vendors after the implementation of BBP 2.0. The share of contract 
obligations going to medium vendors for those contracts signed before and after SBTF remained constant 
at 3 percent. After the implementation of BBP 2.0, it increased to 64 percent. The share of obligations for 
small businesses increased more modestly, from 0 percent, to 1 percent, to 10 percent. Big 6 vendors had 
no market share for any of the periods in our study for military health. Large vendors lost market share in 
an inverse manner to the way medium vendors gained market share. Obligations going to large vendors 
accounted for 97 percent of obligations before SBTF, declining to 95 percent after SBTF, and declining 
again to 25 percent after BBP 2.0.  
Military Health Product or Service Code Contracting Trends 
The share of contract obligations for products, services, and R&D in military health programs remains 
largely the same under the reform periods, with very slight changes under the Sec. 808 guidance. For the 
Young AT&L regime, the pre-reform Dr. Carter AT&L regime, and the BBP 1.0 period, military health 
programs awarded 99 percent of all military health services to services. Under the Sec. 808 guidance, the 
share of contract obligations for products increased to 3 percent, and R&D increased to 2 percent.112  
Military Health Contract Vehicle Contracting Trends 
For all the reform periods with significant military health contract obligations, the predominant majority 
(overall average of 90 percent) was awarded under definitive contract vehicle. Under 2009 NDAA Sec. 
863 guidance, contract obligations awarded under single-price increased from 5 percent to 13 percent. 
However, the contract obligations are not significant enough to determine if this is a temporary or long-
term trend away from definitive contract vehicles.  
Military Health Top 10 Vendors Contracting Trends 
Analysis of the top ten military health vendors by policy regime highlights that this is a less mature 
industrial base than other components. Within each reform period, the data show substantial movement 
both within the top-ten rankings but also the sudden appearances and disappearances of multiple vendors 
from the top-ten vendors in between reform periods. Instead, the military health marketplace is dominated 
                                                     
112 GAO did analyze Military Health’s specific implementation of the Section 808 guidance. They fell within the 




by vendors winning large obligations during specific periods. Since the start of the Young AT&L regime, 
just eight vendors have been awarded more than $1 billion in military health contract obligations: 
1. Health Net—$10.38 billion 
2. Humana—$8.48 billion 
3. United Health Group—$4.02 billion 
4. Express Scripts—$2.58 billion 
5. Highmark—$2.55 billion 
6. John Hopkins University—$1.92 billion 
7. Martin’s Point Health Care—$1.72 billion 
8. Christus Health—$1 billion 
Figure 10-1: Top Ten Military Health Vendors by Reform Period 
 






The data presented in this paper provide a look into how the major DoD components are implementing 
recent acquisition-reform guidelines. Each contract and vendor characteristic has overall trends, but the 
details for individual components vary in magnitude and sometimes in direction. For those characteristics 
where reforms have shown measurable results, two or more components typically lead this trend while 
others lag behind. Furthermore, the data show that while trends are largely cyclical in the first two years 
of an acquisition regime, it’s in the years beyond those first two or so that you begin to see the largest 
impacts of changes in acquisition policy and guidance.  
Using the Appropriate Contract Type  
In recent years, industry has expressed concerns that the recent round of acquisition reforms has 
overemphasized the use of fixed-price contracts. The data affirm that there has been a rise in fixed-price 
contracting across the Department in the recent round of acquisition reforms. While the Army used 
predominantly fixed price for new start contracts before recent reforms, the share of fixed-price 
contracting has increased slightly since the recent reforms. Both the Navy and the Air Force have seen 
similar rises in the use of fixed-price contract types for new contracts. Even the Missile Defense Agency, 
which previously predominantly used cost-reimbursement contracts, has seen increases in fixed-price 
contracting in recent years.  
Increasing the Competitive Contracting Environment 
Across the board, the data show DoD components made little progress in making contracting more 
competitive during BBP 1.0, but there is a glimmer of progress for BBP 2.0. While the Army and DLA 
remained relatively competitive, the Air Force and the Navy both saw effective competition rates decline 
considerably during BBP 1.0. Since then, both services have made small improvements during BBP 2.0, 
but it remains too early to tell if these are long-term shifts or the result of short-term trends driven by 
particular large contracts. In 2014, the military health programs saw enormous growth in contract 
obligations awarded without competition; while it is far too early to form definitive conclusions, this is a 
potentially troubling trend.  
Small Business Participation 
Before the introduction of BBP 2.0, the data show little improvement in promoting small businesses’ 
participation in the DoD contracting marketplace. Under BBP 2.0, the share of total DoD contract 
obligations awarded to small businesses increased. With the recent reforms, the Army leads the promotion 
of small business, awarding the highest percent of all new-start contracts under BBP 2.0 to small business 
(29 percent). Meanwhile, the Navy saw slight decreases under the SBTF guidelines before returning to 
pre-SBTF levels under BBP 2.0. The Air Force contracting data show that service has not improved small 
business participation since the recent reforms. Under the SBTF guidelines, Air Force small business 
participation rates fell and failed to improve under BBP 2.0. MDA and military health, which had 
previously seen negligible small business participation rates, made small but noticeable improvements. 
Contract Vehicle: Increasing Usage of Multi-Award Contracts 
Trends across the Department suggest that the guidance on the use of multiple-award contract vehicles 
has resulted in the decreased usage of that vehicle. For overall DoD, there was actually a decrease in the 
use of multiple-award vehicles when compared to the study period before the implementation of the 
reforms. Those trends are reflected within each of the components with the exception of MDA. Under the 
2009 NDAA Sec. 843 guidance, MDA increased the share of contract obligations awarded under multi-
awards to 12 percent from less than 1 percent beforehand; however, under the 2009 Sec. 863 guidance, it 
fell to 6 percent.  
Shifting Acquisition Portfolios: Services Contracting 
Trends across the Department suggest that the combination of the drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
well as the recent reforms, had a moderate impact on shifts in the acquisition portfolios of the major DoD 
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components. Across the Department, two general trends emerged between BBP 1.0 and implementation 
of the final rule for Sec. 808 of the 2012 NDAA that ran counter to the expected trends. Under BBP 1.0, 
the shares of contract obligations for R&D fell across the Department in spite of guidance to protect the 
technology base. Overall DoD R&D shares fell from 9 percent to 7 percent; in the Navy they fell from 9 
percent to 6 percent, in the Air Force they fell from 23 percent to 12 percent, and for MDA they fell from 
91 percent to 61 percent. Under the Sec. 808 guidance limiting services contract spending, the share of 
contract obligations for services actually rose across the Department, going from 41 percent of contract 
obligations to 44 percent. In fact, MDA and military health programs were the only major DoD 
components to decrease their share of contract obligations for services.  
The implementation of DoD’s guidance related to Sec. 808 of the 2012 NDAA Section varied 
significantly across the DoD components. GAO analysis found that of all the major components, the Air 
Force best implemented and planned for the mandatory reductions in contract services by setting 
command spending targets, soliciting commands inputs, and monitoring command services spending 
throughout the 2013 fiscal year. While the Navy was mostly successful in implementing and actively 
monitoring steps to limit services contract spending, there were significant issues for both the Army and 
DLA. While DLA has relatively few contract obligations for services, GAO found that DLA failed to 
adhere to DoD spending targets because they had failed to solicit command input, set command spending 
targets, or monitor command spending. The Army failed to adhere to their spending targets in FY2013 
and exceeded their goals by $2.69 billion in FY2013. The Army did set command spending targets for the 
fiscal year, but failed to monitor the spending of those commands throughout the year.  
Top Ten Vendors 
Across the Department of Defense, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and 
Northrop Grumman all retained their spots in the top-six defense vendors. Since the end of the Young 
regime, BAE Systems has fallen from sixth place. In their place, Oshkosh temporarily secured the sixth 
position before L3 Communications subsequently overtook them. The components saw varying degrees 
of changes within their top vendors as the United States withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and 
subsequently drew down defense budgets. The Army saw changes, while the Navy and the Air Force 
largely remained the same. However, both components have seen the emergence of new vendors in the 
creation of the joint venture United Launch Alliance and the spinoff of Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, 
which seek to solidify their positions as top-six component-specific vendors.  
The three smaller DoD components, DLA, MDA, and military health, all saw shifts in their top ten 
vendors to an even greater degree than those seen in the Army. While DLA largely retained contracting 
obligations for three of their largest vendors, outside of those top three vendors there was significant 
turnover. Vendors would enter the top ten during one reform period only to fall out in the subsequent 
period. For MDA, the shift from an almost exclusive R&D industrial base saw many of the largest 
defense vendors secure their positions as MDA vendors. Finally, the military health industrial base is 
perhaps the least mature at this time. Instead of a small number companies dominating the entire study 
timeframe, there were companies entering and leaving the top-ten vendors. Instead, the military health 
industrial top vendors were dominated by countries winning significant contract obligations during one or 
two reform periods. With military health contracting obligations likely to continue increasing, this is an 
area of opportunity for traditional vendors looking to expand their portfolio.  
Concluding Thoughts 
The implementation of the recent acquisition reforms has varied significantly across the components. 
Components that have demonstrated implementation of one reform have not demonstrated 
implementation of other reforms. At the component level, this methodology rarely reveals a single 
success story surrounded by inertia. Instead, typically a reform effort will either have minimal effects 
across the board or most components will show some results. One notable factor apparent from this work 
is that defense agencies, perhaps due to their narrower scope of acquisition activity, necessarily closer 
relationship between agency leadership and the acquisition workforce, and direct relationship to the 
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Defense Acquisition Executive, exhibited the greatest responsiveness to policy guidance. The study also 
serves as a helpful reminder that reform does not always move in a single direction. The example of 
contract vehicle shows that particular contracting approaches, such as multiple-award contracts, can come 
into and then fall out of favor. Thus, in some cases the continual process of acquisition reform may not 
represent a consistent failure to get results, but instead shows a steady effort to adapt to the requirements 
placed on the acquisition system. 
This approach holds promise for future research. Moving forward, CSIS will continue to explore these 
issues and the institutionalization of these reforms within the components. CSIS will continue to explore 
the issue of visibility into separation of contracts funded by OCO and those base budgets. With early 
indications that the Congress will approve additional budgetary appropriations to the Department through 
OCO, separating OCO-funded contracts for contingency appropriations abroad and the OCO-funded 
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